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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff/Appellant,

]

vs.
ALAN KAY JUSTESEN,
Defendant/Appellee.

)
;
)
]

CASE NO. 20010315-CA
PRIORITY NO. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§§ 7 8-18al(2)(a)(1999) and 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court properly rule that Justesen had been
seized under the Fourth Amendment, where a law enforcement officer pulled up
directly behind Justesen's vehicle late at night on an isolated stretch of highway,
activated his take-down lights, and immediately asked for proof of Justesen's
identification upon approaching the vehicle on foot?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The factual findings underlying a trial court's
denial of a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah.Ct.App. 1996). The trial court's legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Id.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 22, 2000, Alan Kay Justesen was charged by information with
one count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, one count of Driving on a
Suspended License, and one count of False Information to a Peace Officer. Justesen
moved to suppress all of the evidence which was obtained during his detention and
arrest on the grounds that he was detained without reasonable suspicion, there was
no reasonable suspicion to justify his initial based on Fourth Amendment violations
which occurred during his initial detention. The trial court granted Justesen's
motion to suppress, and on the State's motion, dismissed the criminal information
without prejudice. The State filed a timely notice of appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
On June 17,2001, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Sergeant Steganoff of the
Carbon County Sheriffs Office was patrolling the airport road in Carbon County.
2

(Transcript of Suppression Hearing, hereafter "T" at 4:10-23). The Sergeant
noticed a vehicle, which turned out to be Justesen's vehicle, parked on the right side
of the road with no lights on. (T. 5:6-7). The place where Justesen's vehicle was
parked was on an isolated, dark stretch of road. (T. 24:5-12). The Sergeant testified
that he did not have any suspicion whatsoever of illegal activity related to Justesen
or his vehicle. (T. 18:10-25,19:1-2). The Sergeant testified that he decided to
approach Justesen's vehicle to see if the vehicle was broken down or abandoned, or
if the occupants needed assistance. (T. 7:8-14).
The sergeant pulled up behind Justesen's vehicle, and parked six to eight feet
behind the vehicle. (T. 14:12-17). The officer had his headlights on when he pulled
behind the vehicle, (T. 7:15-19), but took the additional step of activating his bright
"take-down lights," which he described as two spotlights on the top of the police
vehicle, before approaching Justesen's vehicle. (T. 7:24-25, 8:1-5). The Sergeant
testified that he routinely uses the takedown lights when he effectuates a traffic stop
at night. (T. 16:1-4).
The Sergeant approached the driver's side of Justesen's vehicle on foot, and
saw Justesen sitting in the driver's seat with his window rolled down. (R. 8:18-25,
9:1-2). Upon approaching Justesen, the Sergeant did not ask whether he needed
help, but instead asked him for some proof of his identity. (R. 9:8-9). The Sergeant
3

testified that he smelled alcohol as he spoke to Justesen (R. 9:16-20), and asked him
to take a field sobriety test. (R. 10:1-3).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled that Justesen was detained for Fourth
Amendment purposes where the Sergeant pulled up behind Justesen's vehicle on a
dark, isolated stretch of road, immediately activated his take-down lights, and then
asked Justesen for his identification immediately upon approaching the vehicle.
Because no reasonable person under those circumstances would have felt free to
disregard the officer and drive away, Justesen was detained for Fourth Amendment
purposes.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Justesen's Motion to Suppress
Where the Officer Detained Justesen Without Reasonable Suspicion.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See e.g. United States v. Stone. 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989). Under Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), a law enforcement
officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes "if the officer
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has a reasonable suspicion . . . that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v.
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). However, "[a]n
officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions [without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause] as long as the citizen is not detained against his will.
State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah.Ct.App. 1989¥quoting State v. Deitman.
739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)). In the instant case, the officer admitted that he
did not have any suspicion of criminal activity when he approached Justesen, so the
critical question is simply whether the initial stop was consensual, as asserted by the
State, or rather, a detention for Fourth Amendment purposes, as asserted by
Justesen.
A police-citizen encounter is not consensual if, "in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he
was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
In the instant case, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
person could not have possibly felt free to simply disregard the officer's presence
and drive away.

First, the encounter between Justesen and the sergeant took

place very late at night in a very isolated location. Secondly, the officer parked
behind Justesen's vehicle and activated his "take down" lights before exiting his
patrol car. Finally, the sergeant approached the window on the passenger side where
5

Justesen was sitting, and instead of asking whether Justesen needed any help, asked
for proof of his identity. It is hard to imagine that a reasonable person in Justesen's
position would have felt free to ignore the officer's presence and his questions and
simply drive away.
In fact, the circumstances in this case are similar to those in State v. Struhs.
940 P.2d 1225 (Utah.Ct.App. 1997), wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that
the stop was not consensual, and was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. In
Struhs. a sheriffs deputy saw the defendant driving towards a construction site at
about 10:00 p.m. Struhs at 1226. The defendant turned his truck around at the end
of the road leading to the construction site, and backed up against some barricades
and a sign that said "Road Closed." Id The deputy parked her vehicle directly in
front of the defendant's car, nose to nose, but about one-and-a-half car lengths in
front of the defendant's car. hi. The officer activated her headlights and her
takedown lights, and approached the defendant's vehicle on foot. Id The Struhs
court held that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave because of the
late hour, the isolated location, the activation of the takedown lights, and the parking
nose-to-nose with the defendant's vehicle. Id at 1228. Importantly, the court
rejected the State's argument that the defendant was not detained for Fourth
Amendment purposes simply because his car was not completely blocked in by the
6

police vehicle. Id
In the instant case, as in Struhs. Justesen's car was admittedly not blocked in
or physically obstructed by the police vehicle. But, as the Struhs court clearly
recognized, merely because there is a rather obvious rule that a person is detained
where the police physically obstruct the person's exit path, there is not a reciprocal
rule that a person is not detained simply because the police do not physically
obstruct the person's path. The critical question is simply whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to simply
drive away, and the answer to that question, as argued above, is no. Furthermore,
the State incorrectly characterizes the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress
as "concluding that a detention occurred solely because the sergeant illuminated the
dark roadside around the [vehicle]." The trial court based its ruling not only on the
fact that the "extremely bright" take-down lights were activated, but on the time of
night and the isolated location. (R. 13-14). The trial court also based its holding in
part on the fact that the Sergeant asked Justesen for his identification upon
approaching the driver's window. (R. 14)(officer seized the defendant "by
activating his take-down lights and engaging in conversation with the defendant at
the van's window"). Consideration of this factor is consistent with the Struhs
decision, which referred to "the confrontational approach made by the officer" as
7

one factor which rendered the encounter a detention, instead of a consensual
encounter. The only thing constituting a confrontational approach in Struhs was the
fact that the deputy pulled up to the defendant with no lights on, and then suddenly
activated her high beams and takedown light. Struhs at 1228. Similarly, in the
instant case, the Sergeant's request for identification was confrontational in the
sense that it invalidated any possible impression, as well as the sergeant's
assertions, that the sergeant simply wanted to offer his assistance to the car's
occupants. Thus, the trial court's decision was properly grounded in the totality of
the circumstances, and not on the mere fact that the officer activated his take-down
lights.
Finally, the State grounds its arguments, and cites numerous cases, on the
need for safety measures when officers effectuate traffic stops. While officer safety
is undoubtedly a compelling interest, the State's assertions in this regard are
misleading for two reasons. First of all, the State argues that the encounter in the
instant case was a consensual encounter, and not a stop based on reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. With that in mind, it is one thing to argue that safety
measures are required for confrontations between officers and citizens who are
suspected of crimes - and another thing entirely to presume that officers are
endangered by everyday consensual encounters with law-abiding citizens. Surely
8

our free and democratic society has not degraded to a point where police officers
see every citizen as a danger to their lives, and vice versa. If that were so, we might
have to rethink the idea that there could ever be a "consensual" encounter between a
police officer and a citizen. Secondly, but on the same note, the trial court's holding
will not prevent officers from using reasonable safety precautions such as spotlights
in police-citizen encounters - whenever and wherever the officers have reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
In sum, the trial court properly concluded, based in the totality of the
circumstances, that a reasonable person in Justesen's position would not have felt
free to disregard the sergeant's presence, and ignore his request for identification,
and simply drive away. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that Justesen was
detained for Fourth Amendment purposes was correct, and should be affirmed by
this Court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Justesen respectfully asserts that the trial court
properly granted his Motion to Suppress, and requests that this Court affirm the
decision of the trial court.

9

DATED this

2^:day of October, 2001.
DAVID ALLRED
Attorney for Appellant
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